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Extra-Judicial Decision Making for Drug Safety 
and Risk Management: 
Evidence from the FDA 
By Hazel McMullin and Andrew B. Whitford* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Over the last five years, substantial attention has been paid to the arrangements 
employed in the United States for the regulation and oversight of prescription drug use 
and availability, much of it with regard to the New Drug Approval process at the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA).1  One central mechanism used by the FDA 
for making regulatory decisions for medications and medical devices is collaborative or 
team-based decision making.  Advisory committees are charged with helping the FDA 
make decisions; the use of such committees is supported by empirical and analytic 
research on the power of groups to aggregate, assemble, and weigh complex information 
for multi-faceted decisions.2  Of course, the use of decision-making teams is simple in 
neither theory nor practice.   
¶2 The purpose of this paper is to assess the use and value of extra-judicial decision-
making (or deliberative) teams in the form of advisory committees for regulation by the 
FDA.  Our theoretical framework builds on common principles offered in organization 
theory for the design of such coordination mechanisms, and is drawn from literature in 
economics, decision theory, psychology, political science, and public management.  
Specifically, we examine the performance in the context of the structure and functioning 
of the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DSaRM) in the FDA.  
Our examination centers on (1) the composition of such teams, and (2) the performance 
of such teams with regard to standard criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of 
deliberations.3 
 
* Hazel McMullin, B.A., from the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the School of Public 
and International Affairs at The University of Georgia will receive her M.P.A. shortly.  Andrew B. 
Whitford, M.A., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at 
the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, and is the corresponding author. 
1 See, e.g., Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Approval: Processing, Politics and 
Implications for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52 (2004); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996); Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the 
FDA: Reducing Delay in the New-Drug Review, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 397 (2004). 
2 See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW 
AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004); ANNA 
GRANDORI, ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 2001); Matthew J. Gabel & Charles R. 
Shipan, A Social Choice Approach to Expert Consensus Panels, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 543 (2004); Krishna 
K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 
(1992). 
3 GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 150. 
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¶3 We first briefly review theoretical proposals about the value and performance of 
such teams.  After that, we discuss the DSaRM as a decision-making body in detail.  We 
then assess the DSaRM’s composition with regard to standard criteria for decision-
making teams, and then turn to its performance with regard to the criteria we develop.  
Finally, we offer a discussion of this body of theory, case, and evidence about decision-
making bodies in medical decision making. 
II. DECISION-MAKING TEAMS IN REGULATORY SETTINGS 
¶4 The use of deliberative teams in regulatory settings encapsulates two threads of 
theory developed over the past four decades.  By “team” we mean “an ensemble of actors 
with homogeneous preferences, differentiated knowledge and approximately equally 
valuable resources, who decide and control collective actions in a joint mode.”4  In the 
first thread of theory, which centers on team production, it is argued that just as public 
goods cannot be consumed without cooperative action, that “team goods” require 
cooperative action among producers.5  The central problem in the use of such teams for 
production is shirking: each individual asked to contribute to the production of the good 
has an incentive to decrease their effort level as other members increase their effort 
levels.  The solution that Alchian and Demsetz offer to the problem of obtaining joint 
effort is to have a supervisor give instructions, observe the participants’ input behavior to 
detect or estimate their marginal productivity, and apportion awards in line with that 
observation.  The past four decades of theoretical development on the design of such 
teams has centered on finding the proper incentives for the manager (which in the private 
sector might include an ownership stake in the team’s profits).  Yet, we know generally 
that even a manager who observes high quality output from the team as a whole cannot 
necessarily trace and assign responsibility for that outcome;6 the manager then is forced 
to allocate rewards in a fair way, which team members may not trust the manager to do.7  
What can a fair manager do?  One solution might be to reward team members on the 
basis of personal information about each member or information received from the other 
members.8  Even more complicated approaches have been offered, although how they are 
used in practice is less than clear.9   
¶5 In the second thread of theory, which centers on team aggregation, the question is 
whether individuals acting in concert produce better estimates of hidden information than 
individuals acting alone.  Recent books like The Wisdom of Crowds, by James 
Surowiecki, have popularized the insights of other, older theories on the ability of groups 
 
4 Id. at 135. 
5 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972). 
6 Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 328 (1982). 
7 GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 224 (1992). 
8 Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 80 (1979); Dilip Mookherjee, 
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 433, 435 (1984). 
9 See, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 349, 354 (1983); Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); James M. Malcomson, Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with 
Many Agents, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 807, 808 (1986); James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierarchy, 
and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes 
and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983).    
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to dampen cognitive biases and produce less-biased estimates of hidden information.  For 
Surowiecki, large numbers of evaluators with independent, diverse views will average 
away individual-level biases that even experts can experience.10  These biases include: 
availability bias, framing bias, overconfidence, and other risk-prone behavior.11  What 
popular accounts of team information aggregation ignore, though, is the mechanism that 
produces efficient estimation by groups.  That mechanism is detailed in the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem,12 which provides a logic for understanding why a group provides superior 
estimates to individuals through better aggregation of information.  Specifically, the Jury 
Theorem is a result that majority rule is better than “dictatorship” (aggregation of only 
one person’s information) when members of a group have similar preferences but 
different information: that in a two-alternative “election” where people have the same 
preferences but do not know which alternative best satisfies stated criteria, the group’s 
view (based on private signals) performs better than any one member’s view.13  The past 
decade has seen substantial investment in elaborating the Jury Theorem and the 
conditions under which it holds.  A number of papers show the generality of this result,14 
and recently Condorcet’s intuition has been shown to be consistent with that of Nash 
equilibrium.15  This is important because of its concordance with the theory of common 
interest games – which forms a bridge to the economic theory of teams and team 
production.16 
¶6 The contrast between these two threads of research cannot be clearer.  The 
literature on team production emphasizes the “jointness” of production – the fact that 
cooperative (or pooled) interdependence and intensive interdependence among 
individuals17 allow groups to produce outputs greater than the sum of the individual 
products (e.g., “generative” solutions).  In contrast, much of the work on team 
aggregation emphasizes the desirability (if not necessity) of independence of individual 
views as a way of producing less-biased estimates.  Scholars like Ladha have argued that 
few problems arise when independence loses ground to correlated views among members 
of the fact-finding team; indeed, a third thread of research on rational deliberation – on 
the power of discussion among members of a group for negotiation and pragmatic 
deliberation (for ethical discourse) – accounts for correlations among views (indeed, 
proposes ways of increasing correlations) in order to arrive and achieve mutually-
preferred outcomes.18  This thread does have its criticisms, many of which relate to well-
known group pathologies of “groupthink” or differential risk propensities.   
 
10 SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at 23. 
11 See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Possibilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in JUDGEMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 306, 331 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
12 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, An Essay on the Application of Probability 
Theory to Plurality Decision-Making, in CONDORCET:  FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 131 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds. & trans., 1994) (1785). 
13 Andrew McLennan, Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information 
Aggregation by Rational Agents, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1998). 
14 See Ladha, supra note 2, at 620. 
15 McLennan, supra note 13, at 413. 
16 See Roy Radner, Teams, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF JACOB MARSCHEK 
189, 193 (C. B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972). 
17 JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 54 (1967). 
18 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 250 (Ciaran 
Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
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¶7 Generally, though, the following proposals are made with regard to the conditions 
under which correct group dynamics are obtained.19  First, group members should be 
involved in problem definition.  Second, group members should be independent and free 
to generate alternatives.  Third, conflicts between group members should be around 
issues and not against other individuals.  Fourth, group members should have sufficient 
common knowledge for dialogue.  Fifth, there should be sufficient differentiation of 
members’ roles within the group (e.g., a moderator).   
¶8 How do these conditions fit with our understanding of decision-making teams as 
means for joint production?  In joint production, if team members cannot observe one 
another and if supervisors cannot make inferences about the individual efforts from the 
final output of the team, the problem of getting the individuals to “do the right thing” is 
almost equivalent to the canonical incentives problem addressed by bilateral principal-
agency theory.  It becomes difficult to do so because team members may shirk (“free 
ride”) their obligations to help the team perform – or team members may form coalitions 
(“cliques”) with implications for efficient operation.20  Managerially, it is very difficult to 
write and implement a first-best contract that solves these problems.  Indeed, numerous 
studies have shifted the debate to emphasize how managers can strengthen a culture of 
group work.21   
¶9 Team production emphasizes a strong role for management in setting goals and 
defining problems, interdependence of team members, and an almost inevitable conflict 
among members about coordinated action.  Team aggregation emphasizes the importance 
for teams of defining problems as they go, the aggregation of many independent 
individual valuations, and the construction of teams where conflicts between members 
are over information and not values.  To a degree, both threads of research emphasize 
sufficient common knowledge and role differentiation (a moderator in the case of team 
aggregation, and a monitor in the case of team production).   
¶10 In practice, and especially in the governmental use of advisory committees, we may 
observe different emphasis on these two approaches to teams.  Are advisory committees 
like the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee designed for 
aggregating information or producing policy meant to improve drug regulation?  Does the 
DSaRM fulfill the conditions thought to support team production, or the conditions 
thought to support team aggregation?  Conditional on its design as a decision-making 
team, does it perform effectively, efficiently, and fairly?  The next section offers a broad 
overview of the DSaRM and research on the use of advisory committees specifically at 
the FDA for medical decision making.  Following that, we turn to a structured analysis of 
the committee as a decision-making (or deliberative) team. 
 
19 See GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 135; RENSIS LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION: ITS MANAGEMENT 
AND VALUE 155 (1967); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 112 (2d ed. 1970); Norman R. 
F. Maier, Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function, 74 
PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (1967). 
20 See Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Regulating Trade Among Agents, 146 J. INST. THEORETICAL 
ECON. 85 (1990); Hideshi Itoh, Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing, 60 J. ECON. THEORY 410 (1993); 
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 301, 
318 (1990); Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 181, 207 (1986).  
21 Holmström & Milgrom, supra note 20, at 85; Itoh, supra note 20, at 410; Inés Macho-Stadler & J. David 
Pérez-Castrillo, Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains from Cooperation, 11 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
73 (1993). 
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III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE DSARM 
¶11 Advisory committees are widely relied on for providing fair and impartial evidence 
on the benefits and risks associated with medications and medical devices.  The FDA 
alone has thirty such advisory committees, with around eighty-five advisory committee 
meetings a year; the members of such committees are considered “special government 
employees.”22  We focus on the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee, 
which was initially authorized on June 1, 2002, and resides inside the FDA’s Office of 
Drug Safety (ODS) in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).23  The ODS 
was created in 2001 from the Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment with the 
mission of adding “value to the review of risk management programs and the review of 
drug safety issues.”  
¶12 The purpose of the DSaRM is to advise the Commissioner of Food and Drugs “to 
ensure safe and effective drugs for human use and, as required, any other product for 
which the Food and Drug Administration has regulatory responsibility.”24  It meets four 
times per year and consists of both standing and temporary appointed members, and of 
voting and non-voting members (each member has one vote and all votes are of equal 
weight).  Meetings may be for the purpose of information gathering or formal 
recommendation development; formal recommendations to the Commissioner are 
reached by vote.  Topics that have been considered vary from improving the usefulness 
of consumer medical information for prescriptions, to the risk assessment program for 
marketed drugs, and to oral tazarotene for the treatment of psoriasis.   
¶13 While a number of studies discuss how such advisory committees can be used for 
providing topical information for the regulation of medication and medical devices, no 
studies address medical decision making by these groups in terms of the conditions for 
team aggregation and production.  Most studies are imminently practical, centering on the 
policy implications of their proposals.25  Three analyses that examined the structures of 
these advisory committees bear consideration, though.  Steinbrook focuses on the role of 
independence of members of the DSaRM – independence from the views of regulated 
entities through provision of conflicts of interest waivers.26  Specifically, Steinbrook 
notes that the construction of such groups is difficult if one desires full independence due 
to the need for specialized information, but also suggested that full disclosure of potential 
 
22 Robert Steinbrook, Financial Conflicts of Interest and the Food and Drug Administration’s Advisory 
Committees, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 116, 118 (2005). 
23 Talk Paper, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., New Advisory Subcommittee Created on Drug Safety and Risk 
Management (Dec. 18, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2001/ANS01127.html.  The 
DSaRM was originally developed as a subcommittee to the Committee of Pharmaceutical Science. 
24 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
COMMITTEE CHARTER – DRUG SAFETY & RISK MANAGEMENT DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (2006), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/acspage/DSaRMcharter.htm (last visited March 15, 2007) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE CHARTER].  
25 Bruce Goldfarb, FDA Panel Recommends COX-2 Drugs Remain on Market, 2 DOC NEWS 1 (2005), 
available at http://docnews.diabetesjournals.org/cgi/content/full/2/4/1; Eleanor M. Perfetto et al., Evidence-
Based Risk Management: How Can We Succeed?: Deliberations from a Risk Management Advisory 
Council, 37 DRUG INFO. J. 127 (2003); Kate Traynor, FDA’s Adverse-Event Surveillance Needs 
Improvement, Advisers Say, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 1336 (2005); Cori Vanchieri, Researchers 
Plan to Continue to Study COX-2 Inhibitors in Cancer Treatment and Prevention, 97 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 552, 553 (2005).   
26 Steinbrook, supra note 22, at 118. 
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conflicts of interest so that any differences among members expressed in deliberation 
were known to be related potentially to differences in values and not just differences in 
held information.  Similarly, Thompson points out both positives (such as the 
Committee’s use of a facilitator in the form of an executive secretary for efficiency) and 
negatives (such as the prohibition against members conversing in an organized manner 
using e-mail for open meetings purposes) that limit and expand the team’s ability to 
aggregate and process information in a timely manner.27  The DSaRM is not the only 
example of broader thinking about FDA advisory committees and the conditions under 
which they are effective, efficient, and fair.  For example, Shapiro investigates the FDA’s 
Public Board of Inquiry as a deliberative setting for the adjudication of claims over 
scientific disputes.28  The selection of board members, their geographic location, the 
procedures used by members to deliberate – all of these represent core decision points in 
the design and operation of that committee as a means for assembling and acting upon 
technical information with a goal of producing objectively better results.  Of course, the 
issue of effective operation of federal advisory committees is a long-standing concern for 
those with broad public policy (and especially, scientific) interests.  Staffing can be a 
political choice (an exercise in “deck stacking”),29 and such concerns seem to be elevated 
under the current Administration.30 
¶14 The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the construction and operation of 
the DSaRM with regard to standard conditions for the design of teams for information 
aggregation and/or team production.  The few existing studies on these kinds of advisory 
committees indicate how those design elements bind the hands of team members trying to 
develop views on policy information and perhaps even make policy decisions.  While 
most studies center on those policy views and decisions, the underlying causes of the 
views and decisions are neglected – and knowledge of those causes, of the conditions for 
group performance, is a core step toward a better understanding of group decision making 
on medications and medical devices in the federal government.   
¶15 We center our analysis in this paper on the fourteen core committee members 
consisting of thirteen voting members and one non-voting member over the course of two 
meetings.  We focus on the standing committee members because they constitute a stable 
research base and represent the primary members necessary for and involved in an 
aggregation or production decisions.  Recently, the Committee has received substantial 
attention because of its role in high-profile regulatory decisions of the FDA.  As one 
example, in February 2005, the Committee convened jointly with the Arthritis Advisory 
Committee over the safety of cyclooxygenase-2 (Cox-2) inhibitors.  The use of transcript 
information from two meetings was chosen to attempt to evaluate the ability of the group 
to meet its stated purpose (effectiveness) in an efficient and fair manner.  Our first 
selected meeting was held May 5, 2004, and was solely for information gathering 
purposes; it was chosen to focus research on the internal group communication efforts.31  
 
27 Cheryl A. Thompson, Safety Advisory Group Gets Mixed Marks from Members, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. 
PHARM. 236, 239 (2005). 
28 Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA’s 
Public Board of Inquiry, 2 DUKE L.J. 288, 290 (1986). 
29 See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 6 (1990). 
30 D. Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCI. 1456 (2002); Robert Steinbrook, Science, 
Politics, and Federal Advisory Committees, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454 (2004). 
31 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRUG 
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The second meeting used was held February 16-18, 2005, as a joint meeting with the 
Arthritis Advisory Council for the purpose of providing recommendations to the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs;32 this is the Cox-2 meeting.  We chose this meeting to 
provide insight research opportunities about the interactions of the group within a larger 
setting, as well as for evaluating decision making as it relates to the authorized method of 
voting by the group.  In the next section, we turn to an analysis of the DSaRM as a 
committee and the application of core concepts of team decision making. 
IV. TEAM COMPONENTS AND EVALUATION 
¶16 We start by arguing that the DSaRM can be considered a team (in the theoretical 
sense) because it is “an ensemble of actors with homogeneous preferences, differentiated 
knowledge and approximately equally valuable resources (peers), who decide and control 
collective actions in a joint mode.”33  The DSaRM is a selected group of individuals who 
are appointed by a stated authority (specifically, the FDA Commissioner).  The 
committee is charged with being “knowledgeable in risk communication, risk 
management, drug safety, medical, behavioral, and biological sciences as they apply to 
risk management and drug abuse.”34  Membership is chosen selectively, with one voting 
member representing consumers and one non-voting member representing the drug 
industry.35  Based on this stated guidance, we infer that members selected are meant to 
have similar interests toward the goal of evaluating drug safety and risk.  We do not infer 
or attempt to determine whether any members have “hidden agendas” at variance with 
the stated purpose of the committee.  Based on curriculum vitae information36 and the 
committee roster,37 the DSaRM members appear homogeneous in their career choices in 
that all have stated expertise relating to the medical field: four in pharmacology in 
various forms, two in psychology, three in biometrics or risk analysis, two in medical 
 
SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (DSARM) COMMITTEE MEETING 12 (2004), 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/04/transcripts/2004-4040T1.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE MEETING]. 
32 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1 JOINT 
MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 23 (2005), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T1.pdf 
[hereinafter 1 JOINT MEETING]; CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, 2 JOINT MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY 
AND RISK MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 90 (2005), 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T2.pdf [hereinafter 2 JOINT MEETING]; 
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 3 JOINT 
MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 8 (2005), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T3.pdf 
[hereinafter 3 JOINT MEETING]. 
33 GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 135.  
34 COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24, at 1. The DSaRM operates under the provisions of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. § 
2 (2001)). 
35 COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24. 
36 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRUG 
SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE ROSTER (2007), 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/acspage/dsarmroster.htm (last visited March 15, 2007) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE ROSTER]; Channing Laboratory - Richard Platt, http://www.channing.harvard.edu/platt.htm 
(last visited April 22, 2007). 
37 COMMITTEE ROSTER, supra note 36. 
Vol. 5:2] Hazel McMullin and Andrew B. Whitford 
   257
specialties, one in ethics, and one in public health policy.38  We argue that all career 
choices demonstrate reasonable applicability to issues that might be encountered when 
evaluating and making recommendations concerning drug effectiveness and risk.  Our 
starting point is an inference that the committee members have homogeneous preferences 
and meet the first defined criterion to be considered as a team. 
¶17 The stated structure of the group requires that committee members bring certain 
types of differentiated knowledge to the group.  The expertise fields represented by the 
group certainly meet both the stated committee structure and provide a variety of 
applicable but differentiated knowledge backgrounds.  The group also displays this 
differentiation across their current employers: seven members work in academia, three 
for trade/professional organizations/boards, two are in private business, and one works 
for a private hospital.39  This distribution is more heavily weighted in the academic arena, 
but there still exists a differentiated perspective based on employment choices, thus 
meeting the second part of the definition. 
¶18 We evaluated the peer status by compiling information from the curricula vitae and 
roster information of the members to determine if their education levels and professional 
status were similar enough in stature that the members would reasonably recognize each 
other as peers.40  Of the fourteen members four are M.D.’s, six hold Ph.D.’s, five hold 
M.A. or M.S. degrees, four have doctoral level degrees of types other than Ph.D., one 
holds a J.D., and two have other professional credentials.  While some members have 
more than one of the above credentials, all members have advanced educational 
credentials.41  A second evaluation of the professional stature through the use of current 
job titles shows that one is department chair, three are professors, three are associate 
professors, two hold the title of President, two of Vice President/CEO and one of 
Coordinator.  Most of these job titles had additional information further defining the job 
function (such as field of specialty), but we focused on perceived/actual hierarchy 
typically associated with the main title function.42  From general perceptions of title and 
stature all but the “Coordinator” title indicate a high level of status within their 
appropriate organizations.  In further review of the curriculum vitae of the member with 
the “Coordinator” title, we found this person to have come through a retail pharmacy 
background into a hospital setting.43  We expect that the title “Coordinator” has a higher 
level of status inside this environment, which may be comparable to the easily perceived 
high-level titles of the other members.44  The committee members appear to be 
professional peers as well. 
¶19 The structure of the group states that members are either “voting” or “non-voting.”  
Therefore any recommendations made by the committee to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs have been arrived at through a vote count.  Voting, in its nature, meets the 
joint mode criteria.  After reviewing the transcripts, we infer that the committee functions 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; Channing Laboratory - Richard Platt, supra note 36. 
40 COMMITTEE ROSTER, supra note 36. 
41 Id. 
42 For example, the range of additional information included “Patient Care Coordinator,” “Professor of 
Epidemiology,” and “Professor of Bioethics.”  Id. 
43 Id. 
44 We admit that this cannot be verified because the title of “Coordinator” varies in meaning across 
organizations.  
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in a collective and joint decision-making process even prior to the vote on final 
recommendations.45  The meetings are structured around presentations, which allow for 
questions, answers and debate as well as formal question and answer periods.  
Additionally, in the February 2005 three-day meeting where formal recommendations 
were made, any member was given a final opportunity to ask questions, to comment or to 
seek clarification immediately prior to the vote count.  The committee chair 
accomplished this by asking every committee member individually if the member had 
any follow-up questions or comments or needed additional information before the vote 
was taken.46  While there appeared to be no effort to force opinions on one another or 
influence vote selections, there was significant effort jointly made by all committee 
members to ensure that the information was sufficiently covered and presented for the 
benefit of the formal group process of voting.  This meets the last stated team criterion 
that they “decide and control collective actions in a joint mode.”47 
V. TEAM FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
¶20 We next evaluate the DSaRM Advisory Committee team’s ability to function in an 
effective, efficient, and fair manner.  Our evaluation is based on four days of meeting 
transcripts over two meetings.48  The first meeting was a one-day meeting held May 5, 
2004 of the DSaRM Advisory Committee for the purpose of sharing information about 
inhalation drug packaging.  Ten members of the DSaRM committee were present:  nine 
voting, one non-voting.  No votes were required or taken at this meeting.  The second 
meeting was a three-day joint meeting of the DSaRM Advisory Committee and the 
Arthritis Advisory Committee held for the purpose of ultimately making 
recommendations to the Commissioner of Food and Drug to use in the determination of 
whether or not to return VIOXX® and other Cox-2 inhibitor drugs to the market.  We 
reviewed transcripts to determine the type and level of group interactions. 
A. Team Effectiveness 
¶21 We define the effectiveness of the group as the ability to meet the purpose of the 
group, which is stated as “advises the Commissioner or designee in discharging 
responsibilities as they relate to helping to ensure safe and effective drugs for human use 
and, as required, any other product for which the Food and Drug Administration has 
regulatory responsibility.”49  The transcripts indicate that the committee received clear 
and abundant information for its use.  The information included safety data, clinical trial 
 
45 COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 31, at 12; 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 23; 2 JOINT MEETING, 
supra note 32, at 142; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 10. 
46 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 201. 
47 There were two days of full discussion before a single vote was taken.  On the third day, when the first 
vote came, Dr. Wood called for the first vote, saying: 
Any other discussion?  Great.  Let's go, now – now, I have got strict instructions as to how to do this.  
So we have to go around the room and everybody has to say their name and then vote yes or no.  So 
you precede your vote with your name.  And we are dealing with Question 1.a. 
Id. at 184. 
48 COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 31, at 1; 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1; 2 JOINT MEETING, 
supra note 32, at 1; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1. 
49 COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24. 
Vol. 5:2] Hazel McMullin and Andrew B. Whitford 
   259
information, specific product information, and risk/benefit assessment information as 
well as other data.  Industry representatives, FDA staff, researchers, and clinicians made 
most of the presentations.  The committee members’ willingness to verbally engage in 
information seeking and sharing, given their knowledge and backgrounds, imply that they 
had many opportunities to formulate recommendations.  While they made no 
recommendations during the first meeting,50 they voted on at least seven easily 
identifiable recommendations during the second meeting.51  In the case study of the 
transcripts of this meeting, the Committee met its effectiveness criteria in that it provided 
formally stated advice for the Commissioner’s use. 
B. Team Efficiency 
¶22 We evaluated committee efficiency based on the structure of the meetings and, in 
the case of the second meeting, the ability to achieve recommendations based on vote 
count by the end of the scheduled meeting time.  The transcripts for the two meetings 
showed that meetings began at or near the stated meeting times and that the published 
agendas were followed.  Information was presented in an organized manner, questions 
and answers were allowed, and the committee Chair made sufficient efforts to keep each 
meeting moving in a productive, timely manner.  By the end of the meetings Committee 
members seemed comfortable that information had been adequately presented and that 
their questions had been asked and answered inside the stated time frames for the 
meetings.  Both meetings met their stated agenda goals within the original time 
constraints, indicating to us that the group design did function efficiently.  But what about 
external efficiency?  We were unable to analyze whether issues were presented to the 
group in a timely and efficient manner or whether the recommendations made by the 
group were used in a timely and efficient manner.  We restrict our research to the 
efficient use of time during the stated meeting parameters because this is what the group 
can control.  We will return to this issue of external and internal control below. 
C. Team Fairness 
¶23 To evaluate the criterion of fairness, we use a standard definition of “fair” as “just 
to all parties.”52  Does this group function in a manner that is “fair” to each individual in 
that it allows each individual the opportunity to participate?  Is this individual 
participation fair in that members of the group do not unduly influence the participation 
level of others?  Is the participation fair by being reasonably free of the opinion 
influences of acquiescence and groupthink?  Is the process by which final decisions are 
reached fair?  The meeting transcripts from the two meetings cited above were analyzed 
in an effort to answer these questions and draw a conclusion about the fairness 
component of a group. 
¶24 We analyzed four days of transcripts over two meetings to determine if individuals 
had fair and ample opportunities to participate by counting the number of times each 
committee member spoke.  Our count included introductions and vote counts as well as 
 
50 Id. 
51 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 337. 
52 WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 461 (Anne H. Soukhanov & Kaethe Ellis eds., 
1984). 
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questions, answers, and commentary, and was done by a name search through each 
transcript document so that each participant was noted as participating each time the 
transcriber recorded their name as the speaking individual.  During the May 5, 2004, 
meeting of the DSaRM, nine of the fourteen members were present: eight voting 
members and one non-voting member.53  This was an information-gathering meeting 
consisting of presentations and question and answer sessions with nothing to be voted on.  
Members were in turn asked to introduce themselves.  They were on a first-name basis 
with each other as noted throughout all four days of transcript material reviewed, so we 
believe the introductions were for the purpose of getting the participants formally into the 
recorded document and to inform the public, presenters, and others about the identity of 
the committee members in attendance.  The meeting followed the published agenda and 
after formalities to open the meeting, consisted of topical presentations followed by a 
question-and-answer period.  While there were some questions asked during the 
presentations, questions were generally reserved for the question-and-answer periods.  
During this meeting, committee members individually spoke between 6 and 156 times.  
All committee members spoke during the meeting.  The committee chairman spoke the 
most, and much of his commentary was procedural, though determining the distribution 
of commentary between procedural and professional is quite difficult because much of 
this was entwined.  Because the Chairman spoke 129 times more than the next closest 
committee member, and 939% more than the group average of 16.6 times, we removed 
his tally from further analysis.  After the chairman’s tally was removed the members 
spoke between six and twenty seven times each.  The member who spoke the least was 
the non-voting, industry representative.  There are a number of reasons why this may 
have occurred, and we do not have enough information to speculate as to why she spoke 
the least; however, her tally of six was reasonably close to the next voting committee 
member who spoke ten times and much closer to the individual group numbers than the 
chairman, so we did not exclude her numbers from the analysis.  The total number of 
times committee members spoke was 133 during approximately six and a half hours of 
meeting time.  On average each member spoke 16.6 times for an average of 2.5 times per 
hour over the course of the meeting day. 
¶25 We also analyzed the joint meeting of the DSaRM and the Arthritis Advisory 
Committee that was held from February 16-18, 2005.54  This meeting was used to 
determine whether DSaRM members continued to participate in a larger, combined group 
setting where votes were taken for the approval and where recommendations were made 
to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs.  There were eleven DSaRM members present 
for all three days including the non-voting member.  The tallies for these days also 
included introductions and voting round participation.  Over the three-day period DSaRM 
committee members spoke 268 times.  All members spoke between eight and fifty-one 
times.  While the industry leader spoke considerably less than even the next closest 
member (who spoke eighteen times), the removal of her participation number from the 
total did not significantly impact the overall number analysis.  During this three-day 
meeting DSaRM committee members each spoke on average 8.1 times per day for an 
average of 1.25 times per hour.   
 
53 COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 31, at 2. 
54 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1; 2 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra 
note 32, at 1. 
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¶26 In summary, we claim that the DSaRM committee members had a fair opportunity 
to participate, since all present participated in each meeting and the average participations 
per hour indicated ample participation.  While the average number per hour in the second 
meeting was half of that of the first meeting, we attribute the reduction to the fact that 
there were only 23 total participants listed on the formal meeting transcript for the 2004 
meeting while there were an average of 53.6 participants per day listed for the three day 
meeting in 2005.55  Clearly, if everyone participated fairly there would be an approximate 
reduction by one-half when the group size almost doubled from the first meeting to the 
second.  We did not analyze DSaRM participation levels compared to those of the 
Arthritis Advisory Committee. 
¶27 We also concluded, based on the above analysis and a review of meeting structure 
and procedure, that individual members were not hindering others’ participation.  All 
members participated in both meetings, the number of spoken acknowledgements 
remained similar given meeting size over the course of the two meetings, and 
procedurally, prior to voting during the second meeting, the meeting chair specifically 
and individually called upon each member to question or comment one last time before a 
vote count was taken.  The meeting participants were courteous throughout the meeting, 
even during disagreement, and we perceived that no grandstanding, pontificating, 
avoidance, or acquiescence was taking place.  The transcript indicated that all DSaRM 
members were able and willing to participate and exchange information freely. 
¶28 The last component we looked at to determine fairness was the voting process and 
its results.  The voting process in and of itself is generally recognized as procedurally 
fair, particularly when it is conducted using the method of one vote per participant with 
no weighting of votes.  Based on the prior analysis and the source information (official 
transcripts), we did not take into account any possibility of vote manipulation (vote 
buying or swapping), which could occur.  We assumed that all votes were uninfluenced 
by unethical occurrences outside of the meetings themselves.  We analyzed seven easily 
identifiable recommendation voting rounds taken on day three of the February 2005 
meeting56 in an effort to determine if votes appeared to be cast based on the true 
preference of each individual and that groupthink was not likely occurring.  Over the 
seven voting rounds analyzed only the votes during rounds one, three, and five had 
unanimous vote counts of ten “yes” and zero “no” votes.  The remaining four voting 
rounds were diverse in their vote splits as follows: 
Round 2  9 yes 1 no 
Round 4  2 yes 6 no 1 abstain 1 pass 
Round 6  5 yes 5 no 
Round 7  2 yes 7 no 1 abstain 
 
55 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 2; 2 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 2; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra 
note 32, at 2. 
56 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 337. 
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¶29 Since the DSaRM members were part of a larger voting group, there was no need 
to address the split vote count in Round 6, as the total vote outcome was not evenly split.  
Based on the above, more than half the time, the DSaRM members displayed 
disagreement about their voting preferences, indicating their seeming freeness to vote as 
individuals based on their own evaluations and conclusions.  The transcripts showed no 
effort on the part of the meeting chair to re-vote to a closer vote count, nor did we find 
any discussion about the vote count or the results once the vote was taken.  There were 
some references to the readiness of the entire group to move to the vote, and some 
attempts to start the voting round were thwarted because a member was not finished with 
the information gathering process.  A useful step was taken by the committee chair, who 
appeared to promote fairness and to reduce potential bias when he rotated the starting 
member for the vote count to a different voting member at the beginning of each round.  
We could not tell from the transcripts whether the direction of vote taking changed as 
well (left to right, right to left, etc.).  However, the fact that the vote starting point 
changed for each round indicated to us that additional effort was being made to address 
the appearance of procedural fairness and the reduction of potential bias as well. 
¶30 In summary, the DSaRM seems to meet the fairness criteria.  Participants clearly 
exchanged information freely within the context of a formal meeting setting.  The 
atmosphere of the meetings was courteous.  Committee members were on a first-name 
basis.  They were able to state disagreement with presenters and each other and all 
occurrences of this in the parts of the transcripts reviewed showed the disagreements to 
be specifically technical.  We inferred no incidents of personal attacks.  The level of 
participation by individuals seemed reasonable and the voting mechanism and procedure 
was appropriate to ensure individual preferences were expressed. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
¶31 Recall our five conditions, drawn from a diverse basis in organization theory and 
economics, which, when met, contribute to the group “maintaining correct dynamics,” 
presumably leading to a group’s effectiveness and success.  These conditions are that the 
group is involved in problem definition, is free to independently generate alternatives, has 
conflicts focused on the problem and on other members of the team, has sufficient role 
differentiation, and allows for the presence of common knowledge.  We found that the 
group clearly met the second, third and fifth conditions, as illustrated in our analysis 
above.  The group clearly is able to communicate openly in a courteous, respectful and 
friendly environment as reflected in the transcripts.  The only conflicts we read in the 
transcripts solely focused on the technical information presented.  We found no personal 
references about any individuals other than those needed to address or identify members.  
The DSaRM group had the background knowledge (measured in terms of a common 
language, competences, and values) such that they were able to understand one another 
and engage in joint deliberation of ideas.57  With regard to the first condition, that they 
participate in problem identification, we found no evidence in transcript or research 
review to suggest that the committee participates in what issues are brought before them.  
We discerned formal or informal role assignments only in the case of the Chair and the 
 
57 SCHEIN, supra note 19, at 82; Robert M. Grant, Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 17 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 109 (1996). 
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Executive Secretary.  Generally, we claim that the DSaRM meets more of these 
principles about effective group dynamics than not – potentially increasing the overall 
quality and/or timeliness of the product delivered in the form of recommendations. 
¶32 Overall, the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee meets the 
definition of a team and it functions under the conditions which should make the group 
effective, efficient, and fair.  In short, the committee members are “an ensemble of actors 
with homogenous preferences” in that they have similar educational and field of endeavor 
backgrounds as well as an assumed commitment to the safety of drugs as used by the 
general population.58  They bring differentiated knowledge as evidenced by the 
committee structure requirements and their own individual chosen areas of expertise.  
They would be considered peers by their comparable formal education levels and their 
employment status and job titles.  They clearly decide and control collective actions of 
the group together through the voting process. 
¶33 They have also met conditions that make the team effective, efficient, and fair.  
They are effective in that they deliver recommendations to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs and therefore meet their designated and stated purpose.  They function 
efficiently in that they monitor their own activities through the formal meeting structure 
to ensure that deliverables are produced in the stated time frame for decision making, 
within the context of the published meeting dates and times.  Their communications and 
decision-making mechanism is fair in that it allows free exchange of information among 
peers without overt (at least) biases and pressures coming into play. 
¶34 The theory behind this group, its structure, its communication ability and its 
outcomes seems sound and the DSaRM Advisory Committee is virtually the same as 
those artificial committees constructed in theory for the aggregation of information and 
the production of policy. 
¶35 Our analysis focused on the microcosm of the group, its internal ability to function, 
and its ability to meet the charter stated purpose.  The FDA has eighteen drug-related 
advisory committees who prepare information for the use of the Commissioner.  Fifteen 
of these committees specialize in specific types of drugs, two specialize in the 
pharmacological issues of drugs in general, and the DSaRM focuses on the generalized 
safety of all drugs to the general population.  While we did not obtain in-depth 
knowledge of the other committees, we recognize that the DSaRM is one of three 
committees with overlapping responsibility with any or all of the other committees (the 
other two possibly being those in pharmacology).  We reviewed evidence in the second 
set of transcripts that shows that the DSaRM functioned jointly with the Arthritis Drug 
Advisory Committee.  We presume that the FDA could ask the DSaRM to consider drugs 
from any of the fifteen drug-specific committees even though the DSaRM only meet four 
times a year; the structure and assignments for this committee could significantly delay 
information review and recommendations based on time availability and the volume of 
requests from the other committees.  In the larger environment, this situation is probably 
not as functional and efficient as it seems in the microcosm. 
¶36 If we take a step further and examine the macro-environment of the general public, 
we are suspect of placing this organizational team inside the FDA structure.  The FDEA 
uses the results of DSaRM’s deliberations to justify removals of drugs from the market, 
 
58 GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 135. 
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returns of drugs to the market, and packaging/labeling issues.  Most recently, after the 
above-reviewed meetings of February 16-18, 2005, the DSaRM committee recommended 
to the Commissioner that VIOXX® and other Cox-2 inhibiting drugs were safe for use, 
with some packaging and literature insert adjustments, and that they should be returned to 
the market.59  This finding created quite a vocal outcry that was well-covered in the news.  
Some common complaints were that the FDA does not have the best safety interest of the 
public at its forefront and that a committee that is under FDA jurisdiction is only self-
serving and does not provide independent overview of drug safety issues.60  Prior to the 
VIOXX® return-to-market recommendations, the FDA was already under criticism for 
its self-monitoring structure.  Senator Grassley (R-Iowa) stated that he was preparing 
legislation that would separate the Office of Drug Safety (and assumedly its committees 
and subcommittees) from the office that approves drugs for market in an effort to have at 
least one drug approval committee not under FDA jurisdiction.61  We claim that even if 
the DSaRM does internally function as an effective group, in the environment of the 
general public and its legislators there is a problem at least with its perceived ability to 
produce unbiased recommendations.   
¶37 We conclude that a team can be an effectively functioning group within its own 
parameters but not necessarily provide the efficacy to the larger organization within 
which it is established.  The larger organization, here being the FDA, should make a more 
concerted effort to consider external stakeholders and how such a team may or may not 
be perceived and utilized by all stakeholders.  Given the above situation, the FDA 
announced in February (prior to the VIOXX® recommendations) that it would create yet 
another advisory team, to be named the Drug Safety Oversight Board.62  This Board will 
also report through the FDA perhaps setting up yet another situation for internal team 
validity, external inefficiency, and suspect scrutiny. 
 
59 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 262. 
60 Mike Adams, With COX-2 Decision, No Longer Any Doubt About FDA Corruption and U.S. Drug 
Racket, NEWSTARGET.COM (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.newstarget.com/004728.html. 
61 Vascular Web.com, Senators plan bill to revamp FDA drug safety (2006), 
http://www.vascularweb.org/_CONTRIBUTION_PAGES/Patient_Information/Medical_News_Reuters/Se
nators_plan_bill_to_revamp_FDA_drug_safety.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). 
62 Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. to Create Advisory Board on Drug Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A17, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/politics/16fda.html. 
